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Recent research on infant and animal imitation and on mirror neuron systems has
brought imitation back in focus in psychology and cognitive science. This topic has
always been important for philosophical hermeneutics as well, focusing on theory and
method of understanding. Unfortunately, relations between the scientific and the
hermeneutic approaches to imitation and understanding have scarcely been investi-
gated, to the loss of both disciplines. In contrast to the cognitive scientific emphasis on
sharing and convergence of representations, the hermeneutic analysis emphasizes the
indeterminacy and openness of action understanding due to preunderstanding, action
configuration, and the processual nature of understanding. This article discusses em-
pirical evidence in support of these aspects and concludes that hermeneutics can
contribute to the scientific investigation of imitation and understanding. Since, con-
versely, some grounding—and constraining—aspects of hermeneutics may be derived
from cognitive science, both should be integrated in a multilevel explanation of
imitation and understanding. This holds also for explanations that are largely based on
mirror neuron systems, since these appear to be sensitive to developmental and
experiential factors, too.
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Imitation is a phenomenon that has attracted
more and more attention in psychology and
cognitive science in recent years, as recent ar-
ticle collections demonstrate (Hurley & Chater,
2005; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002b). In their fore-
word, Meltzoff and Prinz (2002a) referred to
developments in four areas of research that have
renewed interest in imitation: neonate imitation,
adult social cognition, action–perception inter-
action, and mirror neuron systems. Taken to-
gether, these and other developments show im-
itation to be a crucial part of explanations of
(human) understanding and interpretation of
other subjects and actions.
These collections offer a wide range of ap-
proaches to imitation, ranging from ethology to
economics, from neurophysiology to morality.
Astonishingly, however, philosophical herme-
neutics is not included, not even in their indices.
This is unfortunate, because hermeneutics has
much to offer to research on imitation and un-
derstanding, and cognitive research could em-
pirically ground the processes that hermeneutics
investigates. Since hermeneutics can be an in-
vestigation of both the process and the proper-
ties of understanding and a theory for under-
standing complex intersubjective interactions,
its contributions could be manifold. Moreover,
it focuses directly on imitation.
Originating in 19th-century continental Bibli-
cal scholarship, hermeneutics investigates prob-
lems of translation, understanding, and interpre-
tation, focusing on questions about faithfully
rendering the meaning of texts, symbols, inten-
tions, and thoughts. Imitation was a central site
of analysis and, from the outset, exhibited a
crucial ambivalence: all mimetic acts are re-
quired to reflect their original, but they all in-
evitably diverge from that original. These direc-
tions of convergence and divergence were in
turn influenced by differences in cultural con-
text, tradition, expectation, worldview, and so
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forth. This ambivalence is reflected as far back
as Plato and Aristotle. Plato repudiated imita-
tion, arguing in his Republic that objects in the
material world and cultural artifacts and
thoughts are only a shadow of the eternal ideas,
as pictured in his metaphor of the cave (Plato,
1961). Aristotle, in contrast, was interested in a
more naturalistic approach to imitation, consid-
ering man to be “the most imitative animal” and
analyzing imitation in artistic and sociocultural
relations in which both continuity and innova-
tion can be observed (Aristotle, 1984). For Ar-
istotle, imitation as a crucial form of human
(and animal) interaction has implications for
complex moral functions, the role of tragedy,
and learning in children and adults.
This positive assessment of imitation, imply-
ing both convergence and divergence, grounded
several lines of research in the humanities and
social sciences. In investigating the relations
between imitation and history, imitation was
seen not just as a repetitive and consequently
conservative skill, but as one that fostered both
continuity and transformation, both sedimenta-
tion and innovation. Auerbach’s (1964) Mime-
sis showed how literary modes were imitative
and innovative at the same time with authors
(starting with Homer) imitating reality while
gradually developing new ways of representing
newly discovered layers of reality. The cultural
historian Girard (1988) argued that many epi-
sodes in the history of literature and religion
reflect different aspects of mimetic behavior,
including mimetic violence, as a driving force
in culture. Psychologist Donald’s (1991) Ori-
gins of the Modern Mind considers mimetic
culture as a vital stage in the development of
human culture and attributes to mimetic acts not
just the expected properties of intentionality,
communicativity, and reference but also some
properties that do contribute to its innovative
possibility, such as generativity, unlimitedness,
and autocueing. Cognitive archaeologist Mithen
(2005) made imitation central to his theory on
the coevolution of music, language, and mind in
humans. Taken together, these authors argued
that sociocultural interactions and develop-
ments rest to a large extent on imitation. It is
crucial to both the transmission of behavior,
knowledge and culture, as it is to their diver-
gence, innovation, and even violence.
Imitation in Cognitive Science: Focusing
on Sharing and Convergence
Recent interest in imitation in psychology
and cognitive science has underestimated this
divergent and innovative force in imitation to a
large extent, focusing instead on convergence
and transmission in intersubjective relations.
Here, imitation is what bridges the gap between
individual adults, between neonates, and be-
tween humans and animals. This renders imita-
tion a major candidate for the solution of the
riddle of the development of understanding both
philogenetically and ontogenetically. Moreover,
imitation is an attractive research topic because
of its directness and its apparent lack of con-
ceptual and cognitive complexity, while still
taking part in more complex forms of intersub-
jective understanding. Nevertheless, its promi-
nence in naturalistic theories is fairly recent.
Neonate imitation suggested imitation to be a
phenomenon relying at least partly on innate
mechanisms (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). De-
spite this, imitation in animals and apes proved
less ubiquitous and also harder to investigate,
because of contextual factors, difference of ex-
perimental paradigms, and so forth (Miklosi,
2000). An unexpected confirmation of the hy-
pothesis that imitation is partly innate and not a
strictly human phenomenon came with the ser-
endipitous discovery of mirror neurons. These
mirror neurons show activity in both action
production and action observation or imagina-
tion states, nourishing the idea that imitation is
facilitated by equal neuronal activity on both
sides of the intersubjective gap. Neuronal activ-
ity in two subjects involved in an imitation
relation turned out to be partly identical (Riz-
zolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) and it
was immediately postulated that this “similarity
of representations” in imitation could foster
other forms of social understanding as well.
Since then, several scientific theories on im-
itation have been developed on the basis of a
form of similarity or sharedness in the two
persons involved in the imitating relation. Gall-
ese, Keysers, and Rizzolatti suggested that ac-
tivating similar brain networks in two subjects
involved in an understanding relation creates “a
bridge between others and ourselves” (2004, p.
400) and that this bridge rests upon mirror sys-
tems. Others (Gallese, 2003; Gallese, Ferrari, &
Umilta, 2002) presented a broader shared man-
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ifold hypothesis, in which shared mirror system
networks enable various forms of social under-
standing and empathy. Hurley (2006) presented
a shared circuits model that integrates the
shared manifold and shared mirror systems hy-
potheses in a more comprehensive model. More
modestly, Georgieff and Jeannerod (1998) dis-
cussed shared representations that pertain more
strictly to motor representations. Such represen-
tations appear, however, to be active in different
types of action simulation, including verbaliza-
tion (Grezes & Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 2006).
Others believe that the shared representations
are wider in scope. Thomas, Press, and Haggard
(2006) related them to an interpersonal body
representation that offers direct mapping of in-
terpersonal tactile–visual sensations without a
relation to motor actions. More important, and
in accordance with the hermeneutic perspective,
imitation appears not to be limited to mirror
neuron activity but seems to depend on general
brain mechanisms involved in action and learn-
ing (Brass & Heyes, 2005). More recently, it
has been suggested that we should not just think
of shared representations but also of a shared
world in which we act together and can share
intentions (Legrand & Iacoboni, in press).
Of course, discussions of divergence are be-
ing offered in the cognitive scientific literature,
but mostly in the contexts of blocked or failed
imitations, and are considered secondary. The
complexity of imitation is thus often underesti-
mated, as are the cognitive processes it requires
and its sociocultural and developmental ele-
ments. Because progress in cognitive science
often depends on the integration of conceptual
and empirical insights (Keestra & Cowley, in
press), I argue as to why an explanation of
imitation should include both scientific evi-
dence and hermeneutic insights.
Hermeneutics and Cognitive Science
Contributing to Each Other
Interdisciplinary cooperation between ap-
proaches as different as the neuroscientific
and the hermeneutic often elicits fears of re-
duction, in this case the fear of the reduction
of understanding to mirror neuron systems
activity. Such fears are misguided in many
respects. First, such forms of intertheoretic
reduction are extremely scarce in the history
of science (McCauley, 1986). Second, even
when lower-level explanations are required
for a particular phenomenon, the upper levels
retain their own explanatory force, referring
for instance to contextual influences that
modulate the functions of lower-level mech-
anisms or even their recruitment (Bechtel,
1990). Hermeneutics and cognitive science
can contribute to each other, and since her-
meneutics has since long offered analyses of
the processes of understanding and interpre-
tation that cognitive science investigates,
these analyses may be helpful in avoiding
oversimplification of the imitation tasks to be
investigated. Indeed, hermeneutic analysis of
imitation helps in uncovering its complexity,
emphasizing the diverging force of imitation
in many respects. This could lead to sugges-
tions for novel experimental designs and hy-
potheses. Conversely, cognitive science can
help to explain which constraints often do
play a role in instances of understanding and
interpretation, putting limits on actual herme-
neutic activity. Obviously, this implies that
hermeneutics does not just apply to textual
understanding but also to action understand-
ing, as both Gadamer (1986) and Ricoeur
(1971)–the two most prominent hermeneutic
philosophers— have argued. Action and text
share several properties crucial for their un-
derstanding and interpretation, which will al-
ways remain incomplete and ambiguous. Fur-
thermore, both philosophers have elaborated
on earlier theories of understanding that put
imitation forward as paradigmatic. Ricoeur
(1984) especially has uncovered in detail how
imitation (or mimesis, as philosophers often
term it) enables the understanding of action as
well as of symbolic systems.
Mimesis in this connection is threefold: mi-
mesis1 is the preunderstanding or prefiguration
of what human action is; mimesis2 is the con-
figuration of the action itself; and mimesis3 is
the transfiguration (or reflective understand-
ing) of the two earlier stages in the mimetic
relation. Ricoeur (1991) emphasized that in
any act there are several stages at which struc-
ture and complexity allow for different inter-
pretations. Interpretation is therefore always a
productive and creative act (like imitation
itself) and not just a matter of simple repro-
duction or correspondence.
Mimesis is thus productive and creative at all
three stages in the process and never ends. It is
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not, moreover, a unidirectional process. Rather,
it can be conceived of as an endless cycle in
which all stages or phases mutually affect each
other. This is why Gadamer (1986) and Ricoeur
(1984) have held that, in understanding an ar-
tistic or symbolic action, we should not strive to
erase its Wirkungsgeschichte or effective his-
tory in order to reach a pure or original mean-
ing. This is simply impossible.
I now follow Ricoeur’s (1984) analysis of
mimesis’ three stages and discuss evidence that
proves their empirical plausibility as well. One
can expect such a comparison to emphasize the
indeterminateness and processual nature of im-
itation. These latter properties will not be
equally present in cognitive scientific research,
partially because of its methodological limita-
tions (Adolphs, 2006; Bogen, 2001). If, how-
ever, the scientific evidence partially confirms
the hermeneutic analysis of the imitation pro-
cess, then further integration of hermeneutic
insights in the scientific endeavor will call for a
more detailed investigation of the mechanisms
involved and their functions. This will be espe-
cially true for the mechanisms that cause the
unavoidable divergences between subjects in an
imitation relation and for the mechanisms that
help to detect such divergences or that contrib-
ute to the subsequent adjustment of the imita-
tion interactions. Since there also appears to be
a mechanism that allows subjects to switch be-
tween cognitive strategies for imitation, this
should be considered as well. Such further in-
tegration falls outside the scope of this article.
Instead, I focus on the analysis of the process of
imitation.
Prefiguration and Transfiguration in
Mimesis in Hermeneutics and
Cognitive Science
Perhaps the best known aspect of hermeneu-
tic philosophy is its analysis of the so-called
hermeneutic circle (Bontekoe, 1996), grounded
upon the insight that one does not and can never
start from a zero point in interpretation and
understanding (Ricoeur & Gadamer, 1991). As
Ricoeur explained with respect to mimesis1, or
the prefiguration stage in the process, prior to
any action performance, understanding, or imi-
tation, the subjects involved must already pos-
sess some knowledge of “what human action is,
of its semantics, its symbolism, its temporality”
(1991, p. 142) However, individually acquired
repertoires will not be identical in different sub-
jects, nor are they static in character. Repeated
intersubjective interaction affecting the prefig-
uration of action in the subjects can lead to a
growing shared repertoire, although it will in-
evitably confront subjects with divergences as
well.
That the mimetic process has effects on the
previous stages of the mimetic interaction is
captured by Ricoeur’s (1991) mimesis3, or the
transfiguration stage. Each instance of under-
standing implies that two subjects, with their
respective prefigurations, have to decide on the
configuration of an action and may have to
revise their self-understanding of an action after
seeing an unexpected response or imitation.
This implies adjustments in both subjects, aim-
ing perhaps at a “fusion of horizons that are
believed to exist just for themselves” (Gadamer,
1986, p. 311). Conflicts will inevitably emerge
between the understanding or interpretation of
an action and its possible rebuttal by the sequel
of the interaction (Ricoeur & Gadamer, 1991).
As Ricoeur concluded: “Mimesis is an action
about action. What it prefigures in the first stage
and configures in the second, it transfigures in
the third. To transfigure is still to do something”
(1991, p. 150).
Before offering more detailed analysis of the
middle stage of the mimetic process, I lay out
only some of the empirical results that align
with these hermeneutic analyses of mimesis1
and mimesis3. It has been suggested that the
cognitive acquirement of such a repertoire in the
form of prototypes, schemas, or protocols de-
ploys a structure similar to that of the herme-
neutic circle (Gallagher, 2004). Following this,
one can expect experiences affecting the prefig-
uration stage to enhance specific imitation be-
havior, even if they are quite unusual. This has
been shown in numerous experiments, for in-
stance in macaques using tools, which affects
their body schemas for action and perception
(Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 1996), in cross-
species familiarity with types of action (Buc-
cino, Lui, Canessa, Patteri, Lagravinese, Be-
nuzzi, et al., 2004), in humans familiar with
particular cultural gestures (Molnar-Szakacs,
Wu, Robles, & Iacoboni, 2007), with ballet-
dancing or capoeira (Calvo-Merino, Glaser,
Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005), and
with various forms of musical experience that
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modulate our hearing–doing system (Lahav,
Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007).
Much of this scientific research on imitation
unfortunately avoids the complexity of interac-
tion between subjects (Adolphs, 2006), which
could show reciprocal influences that pertain to
the transfiguration stage. It is well known that
even simple motor behavior is continuously
adjusted (Jeannerod, 1994). More complex dy-
namics have been found in studies of reciprocal
exchanges, affective mirroring, and mututal im-
itations in early infancy (Rochat, 2007). This
involves a comparison process that normally
implies self–other discrimination (Asendorpf &
Baudonniere, 1993; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003),
which appears to be hampered in pathologies
(Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998), although attri-
bution errors are not limited to patients (Jean-
nerod & Pacherie, 2004). Awareness of diver-
gence between predicted outcomes of intended
behavior and its actual outcomes is important
for the experience of agency in general
(Knoblich & Sebanz, 2005) and self-correction
mechanisms involving mirror systems are func-
tional during interactions (Shmuelof & Zohary,
2007). Indeed, even young infants do correct
their imitative behavior (Meltzoff & Moore,
1997), for which play offers much exercise
(Bolton, 1995).
Such confirmations of the hermeneutic anal-
ysis of mimesis invite reconsideration of imita-
tion. In particular, its processual, interactive na-
ture and tendency toward divergence should not
be taken as signs of failed imitation or ascribed
to other cognitive processes. They may well
pertain to the heart of imitation.
Hermeneutics on Configuration
in Mimesis
Each text or action contains internal formal
and symbolic structures that allow for multiple
relations and instantiations. Clearly, no inten-
tion or interpretation can fully cover all the
possibilities that an artifact or action offers (Ga-
damer, 1977). Ricoeur (1984) used the term
mimesis2 to refer to this intermediate stage in
the continuous process of mimesis. While refer-
ring to the familiar elements of the plot of a
myth that allow for rearrangements, he men-
tioned three sets of relations that direct such
arrangements or emplotments of a narrative
(Ricoeur, 1984). I here translate them to the
domain of action.
Configuration is important because an action
is never merely a single event or a simple suc-
cession of events. There are always complex
relations between discernable subactions and
the responses that the action provokes. Also, an
action always involves heterogeneous ingredi-
ents such as “agents, goals, means, interactions,
circumstances, unexpected results” (Ricoeur,
1984, p. 65). The third set of relations that
contributes to the configuration of an action is
temporal, such as its duration or the temporal
variations between its parts. This temporality
will also influence the response of an interpreter
or imitator, for which his own experiences will
play a role again. Even apart from the diver-
gence caused by the prefiguration and transfig-
uration stages of mimesis, this configuration of
any action in itself implies heterogeneity. Imi-
tation therefore requires a lot of cognitive pro-
cessing to reach an agreeable mixture of con-
vergence and divergence between subjects.
Some Cognitive Scientific Indications of
the Configuration of Action
It is important to keep in mind that most
behavioral or imaging experiments to date have
used simple actions. For experimentation with
children and monkeys, and for ensuring identi-
cal repetitions of an action, this simplicity is
essential, but it seriously limits the configura-
tion characteristics of the actions.
Nevertheless, it has been noted that children
and apes show a striking difference in their
imitative behavior relating their observation and
performance of the different configuration of an
action. Apes tend to imitate an action in a lim-
ited way, geared toward imitation of its goal
(Tomasello, Carpenter, & Hobson, 2005). That
is, they compress the action, leaving out parts
that are not relevant to its end or goal. In com-
parison with children, who will imitate com-
plete actions, chimpanzees try to eliminate the
irrelevant elements of an action (Horner &
Whiten, 2005), affecting the mimesis of its con-
figuration. Human capability for a complete en-
coding of an action facilitates mimesis of an
action on multiple levels of intentional granu-
larity and distinguishing between end goals and
intermediate or subsidiary goals (Lyons, Santos,
& Keil, 2006). Thus imitation not only contrib-
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utes to the succession of cultural conventions
but also allows for some subtle divergence from
such conventions; a subject may choose flexibly
among different strategies for the same goal, or
use the imitated means for reaching a different
goal, for instance.
Research also shows that mirror neurons are
not only important in the performance, imita-
tion, simulation, and recognition of actions
thanks to the fact that they provide-partly-
shared representations for these. These mirror
neurons are also integrated in larger systems,
that contribute in other ways to the processing
of actions. For instance, mirror neurons appear
to help in recognizing and action even if it
is partly hidden from sight behind a screen
(Umilta` et al., 2001). This has led to the idea
that they do not just code for observed actions
but that they are indeed parts of logically related
systems that code for complete—yet partially
unobserved—actions. For instance, an experi-
ment in which contextual factors (another in-
gredient of the configuration of action) are var-
ied proves that even monkeys react differently
depending on the context (Iacoboni, Molnar-
Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, & Mazziotta, 2005).
This means that they code for the chain or
association of a context to a particular goal of an
action and thus for the intention of the action.
However, as we have learned from herme-
neutics, the configuration of an action is open to
diversity, and therefore goals and intentions are
not always easy to infer. Indeed, overimitating
the details of an action may help to preserve its
configuration details and consequently to flexi-
bly change the configuration in imitation. Chil-
dren do not always “ape,” for example, but will
shift to another strategy under certain condi-
tions (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002).
Such switches in imitation strategy are con-
firmed by another finding in which they
switched cognitive strategies when confronted
with novel situations and used an inferential
strategy (Gergely et al., 2002). It is still a matter
of debate whether great apes are similar to hu-
mans in this respect. However, using the same
experimental paradigm as Gergely et al. (2002),
Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello
(2007) proved that apes that were encultured
and used to observing human actions take sec-
ondary factors about the model into account
when choosing their imitation strategy as well.
It may therefore be that these abilities do not
just depend on neural machinery, but on rearing
conditions (such as the presence of models) and
development as well.
The research mentioned in this section em-
phasizes the complexity of action imitation,
partly due to the many different types of con-
figuration of seemingly simple actions. As those
configurations are partly dependent on action
goals and intentions, not only is imitation a
rather complex task, but so is the detection of
intention. In light of this, the sharing or conver-
gence of representations between subjects could
be only of rather limited value. Instead, a pro-
posal has been made recently for a rather com-
plex intentional network in humans that would
allow differentiation between private or social
intentions while discriminating between present
or future goals (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007). It is
likely that in such intention detection, the rec-
ognition of convergence and of divergence
would play a role, recruiting different brain
areas.
Since hermeneutics is mostly associated with
language interpretation (although Gadamer
[1986] and Ricoeur [1971] emphasized its ap-
plicability to action interpretation, too), I pay
some attention to evidence related to language
processes. An analysis has been offered sug-
gesting that imitation may depend primarily on
two components: the possession of a vocabulary
of action elements and a string-parsing mecha-
nism that helps to discover regularities in the
chains of elements (Byrne, 2002). This is not to
say that action processing occurs along identical
pathways as language processing, but the two
appear to be less modular and more related than
previously thought. Action and language pro-
cessing do, for instance, partly recruit identical
brain circuits (Pulvermu¨ller, Hauk, Nikulin, &
Ilmoniemi, 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Lan-
guage development may indeed build on simple
forms of imitation behavior, progressing to
more complex and indeterminate action se-
quences (Arbib, 2005). Language reception and
production and action recognition partly recruit
similar brain areas (Hamzei et al., 2003;
Watkins & Paus, 2004), and action and lan-
guage semantics appear to contribute simulta-
neously to establishing interpretations (Wil-
lems, Ozyurek, & Hagoort, 2006). The mirror
neuron system would ground the parallel devel-
opments of such action and language construc-
tions (Kemmerer, 2006), while Broca’s region
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allegedly has some specific time-related func-
tions in both the action and language domains
(Nishitani, Schurmann, Amunts, & Hari, 2005).
These correlations between language and action
developments and processes reinforce the pos-
sibility that the figurations of mimesis can be
found in language as much as in action process-
ing, and thus in imitation, too.
In conclusion, actions contain configurations
that are responsible for their indeterminateness
and ambiguity. In imitation this can lead to
divergence in goal or intention ascriptions,
which in turn will influence expectations and
anticipations. As is noted in the previous sec-
tion, imitation should be conceived of as a con-
tinuous process and not as an unidirectional
singular event. Therefore we should expect a
complex interaction between partially overlap-
ping and partially nonoverlapping brain areas
involved in the process.
Integration of Hermeneutic and Cognitive
Scientific Approaches to Mimesis in a
Multilevel Explanation
Our proposal for integrating hermeneutics
and cognitive science is not new, but more
detailed discussions of what such an integration
could look like are rare. The brain, being a
highly dynamic and self-organizing system, has
been called a hermeneutic device (Erdi, 1996)
that uses a hermeneutic circle during visual
object recognition (Stent, 1981), while others
have referred to neurohermeneutic systems
(Reyna, 2002) involved in understanding and
interpretation.
Hermeneutics empasizes particularly the
intersubjective and interactive nature of under-
standing, which is difficult to investigate empir-
ically (Looren de Jong & Schouten, 2007). Sim-
ilarly, understanding is variously dependent on
contexts (as hermeneutics shows) that our brain
is capable of incorporating in its functioning (as
cognitive science shows; Gallagher, 2004). This
has led to hypotheses that also acknowledge the
cognitive influences of cultural models (Shore,
1996) or that incorporate social and cultural
aspects in theories of situated, embodied, or
embedded perception and cognition (Semin &
Smith, 2002). Clearly, hermeneutic processes
that include the figurations of mimesis play a
role in these aforementioned processes that im-
ply understanding and experience of many
forms of divergence.
I have discussed evidence for aspects of im-
itation depending on, among others, individual
experiences, expectations, and different cogni-
tive strategies. It follows from this that it is
impossible to predict what types of processing
will be used in each instance of mimesis. In-
deed, it is not surprising that some no longer
consider imitation to be a unitary phenomenon,
but rather a complex one (with different levels
and mechanisms), allowing for bottom-up as
well as top-down influences. Obviously, such a
complex process will follow a developmental
trajectory (Jones, 2007), in which earlier stages
may scaffold later mimetic skills. These skills
may be partly performed at will, offering not
just low-level but also high-level mind reading,
recruiting mirror systems and more complex
semantic or inferential processes, respectively
(cf. Arbib, 2005; Frith & Frith, 2006; Gergely et
al., 2002; Goldman, 2006; Muthukumaraswamy
& Johnson, 2007). Similarly, theory of mind
processes covary with linguistic and cultural
experience (Kobayashi, Glover, & Temple,
2006). Moreover, since mimesis turned out to
be a highly interactive and dynamic process, it
is probable that mimesis frequently starts as a
low-level process but that interactions are so
divergent as to enforce involvement of high-
level processing, or vice versa. Elements of
sharing or convergence are therefore likely to be
only partially responsible for the imitation pro-
cess and should not be taken as more fundamen-
tal than those divergent elements that do not just
hinder imitation but—paradoxically—equally
contribute to it. Consequently, since mirror neu-
rons or mirror neuron systems seem to be par-
ticularly active in convergent aspects of imita-
tion, they can at most play a limited role.
As has been witnessed, hermeneutics plays a
double role in all of these analyses, helping both
to explain the general process of mimesis and to
show how particular cases could play out. This
leads to the conclusion that mimesis consists
primarily of convergence only in exceptional
cases; for the rest, it will depend on a complex
variety of processes that will lead to conver-
gence and divergence between subjects.
Of course, in such a multilevel explanation, the
converse also holds: the hermeneutic plea for in-
determinacy and divergence in mimesis can lose
some plausibility when facing particular instances
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of mimesis that appear to be unambiguous and
easy to process via low-level mechanisms, leaving
hardly any room for divergence between subjects.
Indeed, many action paradigms studied presently
in cognitive science experiments are of this kind.
In such cases, room for hermeneutic contribution
to mimesis or action understanding may be ex-
tremely limited and constrained by the mecha-
nisms involved. However, if indeed low-level
mechanisms such as mirror neuron systems are
susceptible to developmental and contextual influ-
ences, then hermeneutics may even contribute to
the explanation of such “simple” cases. More than
anything else, hermeneutics could help cognitive
science to expand its field of study and to ac-
knowledge the complexity of most actions and
interactions. Through such interdisciplinary coop-
eration we will gain knowledge and insight in the
rich texture that human action and interaction of-
fers, and not just in its impoverished variants.
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